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http://www.jstor.orgAppropriation  and Efficiency: 
A Revision of the First  Theorem of Welfare  Economics 
By Louis  MAKOWSKI  AND  JOSEPH  M. OSTROY* 
The  First  Theorem  of Welfare  Economics  rests  on the  assumption  that  individuals 
have neither  price-making  nor market-making  capacities.  We offer  a revision  in 
which individuals  have such capacities.  The revision  emphasizes  two keys  for 
market efficiency: (i)  the  need  to  align  private rewards with  social 
contributions called  full appropriation,  and (ii) the need  for an assumption  to 
counter  the possibility  of coordination  failures  in the choice of produced  com- 
modities  -called  noncomplementarity.  We  also emphasize  that  information  about 
prices of unmarketed  commodities  involves  decentralized  knowledge  available 
only  to  product  innovators  and that  pecuniary  extemalities  are  important  potential 
sources  of market  failure.  (JEL D51, D60, D62) 
The First  Theorem  of Welfare  Economics 
provides  a set of sufficient  conditions  for a 
price system to efficiently coordinate eco- 
nomic activity.  It is a beautiful  result,  with a 
strikingly  simple proof. But its reliance on 
price-taking and  complete  markets con- 
tributes to a lack of explicit emphasis on 
strategic/incentive  issues. This paper offers 
an alternative,  complementary  set of suffi- 
cient conditions for efficient coordination, 
one that emphasizes  the importance  of full 
appropriation  rather than price-taking  be- 
havior. 
Once appropriation  is given center stage, 
our understanding  of the reasons for eco- 
nomic efficiency  deepens. For example,  the 
fit  between the  theory of  market failure 
(which already  emphasizes  problems  of ap- 
propriability,  in the form of  externalities) 
and the theory of market success becomes 
tighter.  To give a second illustration,  in the 
First Theorem the set of available  markets 
must be complete; hence, product innova- 
tion cannot occur. By contrast,  in a model 
for achieving  economic efficiency  based on 
appropriation,  innovative  activity  may  be re- 
garded as endogenous.  The extent that the 
innovator  can fully appropriate  the conse- 
quences  of his innovations  becomes  the cen- 
tral question, as far as efficiency is  con- 
cerned. 
As  this suggests, complete markets will 
not be  a  maintained assumption in what 
follows. There is,  however, an  important 
limitation: the model below does not ad- 
dress issues associated with moral hazard 
and adverse  selection.  In later  work  we hope 
to show how these too can be usefully re- 
garded  as appropriation  problems.  To give a 
suggestive  illustration,  it is well known  that 
"residual  claimant  contracts"  can efficiently 
resolve moral-hazard  problems  when agents 
are risk-neutral.  By making the agent the 
residual  claimant,  one forces him to appro- 
priate  fully  the consequences  of his actions.1 
The First Theorem is based on the Wal- 
rasian model  of  economic  coordination, 
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1J. G. Head (1962) also argues  for the central  im- 
portance  of appropriation  for welfare economics.  He 
pursues  the argument  broadly  and vigorously.  Here we 
take a complementary  and more formal  route, relating 
appropriation  to the First  Theorem. 
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where individuals  have neither  price-making 
nor market-making  capabilities.  By contrast, 
our revision is based on an extension that 
we call a model of occupational  choice. It is 
related to  mechanism design in  that the 
market  outcome  can be described  as a Wal- 
rasian  mechanism  in which prices as well as 
marketed  commodities  respond  to individu- 
als'  occupational  choices.  Thus,  in the model 
of occupational  choice there is: 
price-making:  individuals  may be able to in- 
fluence market-clearing  prices by their 
choice of occupations;  and 
market-making:  individuals  determine  the set 
of  available markets by their choice of 
occupations. 
To illustrate  its workings,  production  at dif- 
ferent scales can be modeled as the choice 
of  different occupations, so  the producer 
may be able to influence  prices by choosing 
to operate at a smaller  scale. Or to illustrate 
market-making,  different occupations may 
involve the  introduction of  different new 
commodities (in  the  model, markets are 
open  only  for  commodities that  can  be 
actually  supplied given individuals'  occupa- 
tional choices; hence the choice of  occu- 
pations  has  a  market-making  role).  An 
equilibrium in  the  model  is  called  an 
occupational  equilibrium. 
Our main result identifies conditions  un- 
der which occupational equilibria will be 
efficient, in spite of the greater scope for 
individual  choice and self-interested  behav- 
ior. We show that, if the following  two con- 
ditions are met, then the allocation of re- 
sources  will be Pareto efficient: 
fuill  appropriation  (FA): each individual's  pri- 
vate benefit from any occupational  choice 
coincides  with his/her social contribution 
in that occupation;  and 
noncomplementarity  (NC):  a  subadditivity 
condition  is satisfied among occupational 
choices made by different  individuals. 
The central condition,  full appropriation, 
represents an  extension of  Pigou's "ap- 
propriation logic" which  underlies both 
market  success and failure. Specifically,  FA 
requires private and social benefits to be 
aligned. Its role is to give individuals  the 
right  incentives  in  their  occupational 
choices, and hence in both their price-mak- 
ing and market-making. 
Because market-making  is  endogenous, 
even with full appropriation,  coordination 
failures can occur. (Early examples of this 
phenomenon  are  underinnovation traps 
pointed out by Tibor Scitovsky  [1954].)  The 
noncomplementarity  condition rules these 
cases out. This result is based on conditions 
identified  by  Oliver  Hart  (1980)  and 
Makowski  (1980b) as sufficient  for efficient 
product innovation  under perfect competi- 
tion. While both of  these studies contain 
heuristics  pointing  to the importance  of ap- 
propriation,  their primary  focus is on a par- 
ticular application,  rather  than on incorpo- 
rating their findings into standard  welfare 
economics  (i.e., the First Theorem). 
Some recent developments  in macroeco- 
nomics  and industrial  organization  study  the 
implications  of strategic  complementarities  in 
imperfectly  competitive  models (see Russell 
Cooper and Andrew John,  1988; Xavier 
Vives, 1989; Walter P. Heller, 1986; Paul 
Milgrom  and John Roberts,  1990).3 In terms 
of our revision  of the First Theorem,  ineffi- 
ciencies due to strategic  complementarities 
arise from an amalgam  of failures of FA 
and failures  of NC. 
We call our main result a "revision"  be- 
cause its two assumptions  are stated in a 
language  unlike  that used in the First  Theo- 
rem. Instead of  emphasizing price-taking 
and complete markets,  FA and NC directly 
describe the structure  of individual  payoffs 
that give good incentives.  Such payoffs  may 
arise in  either a  thick-market  or  a  thin- 
market setting. In  either setting, perfect 
2 
The model of occupational  choice collapses to a 
standard  Walrasian  model when each individual  has 
only one occupational  choice (i.e., no choice at all). 
3The term "strategic  complementarities"  is found  in 
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competition is  a  key ingredient for  effi- 
ciency:  it leads to FA. By "perfect  competi- 
tion" we  mean not just price-taking,  but 
something  stronger:  that individuals  actually 
face perfectly  elastic demands  and supplies 
(PEDS). 
Consider a  thick-markets setting  first, 
where all commodities  are standardized  and 
there are many buyers and sellers of each 
commodity.  In such a setting, intense com- 
petition among buyers and among sellers 
will typically  lead to PEDS. This is probably 
the most natural setting for applying the 
standard  First Theorem: both price-taking 
and complete  markets  make sense here. We 
show that in  a  thick-markets  setting, FA 
and NC are satisfied. Thus, in this setting 
the revision complements the First Theo- 
rem by making  explicit the reward  scheme 
that induces  efficiency.  Of course,  one could 
say that the standard presentation,  where 
price-taking  is  a  shortcut for PEDS  and 
complete  markets  is a shortcut  for standard- 
ization, yields  a  simpler statement and 
shorter proof. Our claim is that taking the 
shortcut means bypassing  the central issue 
of  appropriability  underlying market effi- 
ciency. (See  Remark 3  for  an  important 
instance where the link between appropri- 
ability  and efficiency  was bypassed.) 
Consider next  a  more  dynamic thin- 
markets setting, where product innovation 
is an issue. Suppose  that, among  all conceiv- 
able commodities (a  huge set),  most are 
never innovated.  A difficulty  with interpret- 
ing the standard  First Theorem in such a 
setting is its "uneconomical"  use of price 
information:  why should there be  market 
prices for all conceivable  commodities?  Al- 
ternatively  put, while it might  be an appeal- 
ing fiction to have an auctioneer  announce 
prices  of  standardized commodities, the 
auctioneer  may have no idea of what needs 
to  be  priced in  a  world of  personalized 
commodities. 
The model of  occupational choice per- 
mits a  more appealing, decentralized de- 
scription of pricing in such a setting. We 
assume that each seller only has access to 
the prices of currently  marketed  commodi- 
ties and the prices of commodities  that he 
can innovate. For example, a supplier  of a 
word-processing  program  who is capable of 
also producing  a (not yet existing) spread- 
sheet program  knows  the price at which the 
latter could be sold because that is part of 
his decentralized  knowledge:  it comes from 
participating  in his segment of the software 
market.  But he may have no idea about the 
potential price of  a new item of  clothing 
apparel or even the potential price of new 
computer  hardware  because that is not part 
of his technological  expertise. We call this 
"local  price  information." Markets  are 
"complete"  in the sense that the potential 
price of  any new commodity  is known by 
someone,  but price information  is decentral- 
ized because-assuming that any one seller 
can innovate only a narrow  range of com- 
modities-no  one knows  most prices. 
Local price information  may be too de- 
centralized to reflect accurate information 
about complementarities  among the  com- 
modities not currently  marketed.  The diffi- 
culty can be traced to a kind of pecuniary 
externality  in which  innovations  by one indi- 
vidual affect the market  valuations  of oth- 
ers' potential innovations.  Nevertheless,  we 
show that FA and NC (hence efficiency)  will 
result under perfect competition,  provided 
that local price information  satisfies a con- 
sistency  condition.  As this suggests,  in con- 
trast to  a  thick-markets  setting, achieving 
FA  and NC  in  a  thin-markets  setting is 
much more delicate. With complete mar- 
kets, all prices are common  knowledge,  and 
hence, price consistency occurs automati- 
cally. One could argue that the complete- 
markets assumption in the standard First 
Theorem is a shortcut  which yields a sim- 
pler statement  and shorter  proof;  and again 
our claim is that taking  the shortcut  means 
bypassing  another  issue:  the price decentral- 
ization problems  associated  with the alloca- 
tion of  nonstandardized  commodities (see 
Remark  4). 
In this paper we  do not strive for the 
utmost generality,  preferring  to emphasize 
principles. One simplifying  assumption  de- 
serves special mention. We  shall assume 
that  individuals have  quasi-linear prefer- 
ences. This allows for cardinal  measures  of 
individuals'  private  rewards  and their social 
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tates emphasizing  the appropriability  theme. 
From our work on the  no-surplus approach 
to perfect competition in both its ordinal 
and  cardinal versions (Makowski, 1980a; 
Ostroy, 1980;  Makowski  and Ostroy, 1987), 
we strongly  surmise that there are ordinal 
analogues of  our current results, just  as 
there is both an ordinal and cardinal  ver- 
sion of the no-surplus  condition. There is 
also a simplified  treatment  of firms in this 
paper,  relative  to the Arrow-Debreu  version 
of the Walrasian  model. While the "individ- 
uals" in the model of occupational  choice 
may  possess  production  possibilities  and  may 
be interpreted as single proprietary  firms, 
the model does not include firms  with mul- 
tiple shareholders.  This is just to avoid the 
notational  complications  involved  in includ- 
ing shareholdings  and the required  redistri- 
butions  of profits,  complications  that would 
distract  from our main goal: an alternative 
presentation  of the First Theorem. 
The contents of the rest of the paper are 
as follows.  The model  of occupational  choice 
and a basic example are described  in Sec- 
tion I. Section  II gives  the main  result.  First, 
it is proved that rewarding  individuals  with 
their social marginal  products (full appro- 
priation)  is good for incentives:  it leads to 
efficient  occupational choices,  excepting 
perhaps for some coordination problems. 
Second,  when the changes  in the gains from 
trade are subadditive  (the noncomplemen- 
tarity  condition),  no coordination  problems 
will arise. Section III gives the thick- and 
thin-markets  applications of  our revision. 
The ultimate  goal of any  formalization  of an 
invisible-hand  theorem is to guide our un- 
derstanding  of market  success/failure.  With 
this in mind, Section IV concludes with a 
brief discussion  of some implications  of our 
method of proof. 
I. The  Model  and an Example 
Although  the Walrasian  model permits a 
broad range of possible interpretations,  the 
Walrasian  conception  of the coordination  of 
economic activity  fosters a certain point of 
view that might  be termed a "thick-markets 
mentality."  According to  this  vision, the 
world  is described  by a fixed set of commod- 
ity markets as the paved highways  of eco- 
nomic travel. In contrast to  this, we will 
take a "thin-markets"  approach.  What we 
mean by this is that we shall try  to avoid  the 
fixed set of roads upon which individuals 
travel. The  aim is  to  portray a world in 
which  economic  actors  are connected  not by 
several main highways,  but by a myriad  of 
individual  byways  of their own construction. 
It is this alternative  vision that underlies  the 
following.4 
We pose the problem  of the coordination 
of economic activity  by supposing  that each 
individual  can be one of several different 
types.  Call these types  the possible  "occupa- 
tions" for  the  individual. More formally, 
there are n individuals,  indexed by i. For 
each individual i  there is  a  given set  of 
possible occupations  Vi from  which he must 
choose exactly  one. An assignment  of indi- 
viduals to  occupations is  a  v = (vl,.... 
v, ... , vn)  E X Vi.  --  xi Vi represents the 
set of all possible assignments. 
In order to include both pure exchange 
and production-and-exchange  economies, it 
will be simpler  to work in trade  space.  Thus 
we leave implicit i's consumption  and pro- 
duction decisions,  which are his private  in- 
formation,  to focus on what is essential for 
the model, his trade relationships.  A trade 
for individual  i is a point z  i E Re  with the 
sign  convention that  positive  (negative) 
components of zi  represent his purchases 
(sales). Observe that  i's preferences over 
trades  will generally  change  when his occu- 
pation changes, even  if  his  consumption 
tastes remain  constant  (e.g., if he becomes a 
baker then he will value the purchase of 
1,000 bushels of  wheat more than if  he 
becomes  a candlestick-maker).  Thus,  when i 
chooses an occupation vi  E Vi, he chooses 
both a trading  possibility  set Z(vi) and pref- 
erences over the possible trades in Z(vi). 
To capture both aspects of occupational 
choice,  we view an occupational  choice vi as 
an  extended  real-valued function  (i.e., 
vi: Re  , DR  U { -  oo)). Our convention  is  that 
4Formally, thick markets will be  a special case; see 
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those trades  zi E R' which are infeasible  for 
i are assigned a utility level of  -  oo.  Thus, i's 
trading possibility set  in  occupation vi is 
given by the effective domain of vi, that is, 
Z(vs) = {zi: vi(zi)  >  -oo}- 
Thus the function vi does double duty: it 
identifies  both i's trading  possibilities  in oc- 
cupation vi and also his preferences over 
possible trades. Examples illustrating the 
flexibility  of the setup will be given. Notice 
that since we are in trade space, the zero 
vector in RD  corresponds  to no trade,  which 
we shall assume  is always  an option.' 
In addition  to trade in the e  commodities, 
there is also a money commodity  that the 
individual  can use to establish  quid pro quo 
in exchange. Utility from these e+ 1 com- 
modities depends only on i's characteristics 
vi because  all  individuals have  quasi-linear 
utility functions  with respect to the money 
commodity.  That is, i's utility from (zi, mi) 
el  R  x DR  when he  is  in  occupation vi is 
given by 
Vi(Zi)  + mi. 
To preserve  the quasi-linearity  of the model 
we  put  no  limitation on  the  amount of 
money i  can supply (the  spirit is  that  i 
never hits the boundary  of his money en- 
dowment). 
The  set  of  commodities which can be 
potentially supplied in the economy is re- 
stricted  by individuals'  occupational  choices. 
To express this formally,  let  h index com- 
modities, h =1,.,  . So for any given trade 
x =  (xl,...,  x,...,xe)GERe  Xh  represents 
the amount of commodity  h purchased  (if 
Xh  > 0) or sold (if Xh  < 0). Let 
H(v) = {h: Zih < O 
for some i and some trade  zi E Z( Vi)} 
represent the set of commodities  that can 
be potentially  supplied in v. We make the 
harmless assumption that all commodities 
can be  potentially supplied: U, E  H(v)  = 
{1,  ...., e}.  Define the subspace 
Re(v)  =  {xE  Re:  Xh =  0  for all h  - H(v)}. 
Once the  assignment v  to  occupations is 
made, trading is restricted to DRe(v). 
Trades z = (zi) are feasible for v if each 
zieZ(vi)n  Re(v) and Eizi =  0. Let Z(v) be 
the set of all such trades. 
Definition:  Given an assignment  v, a Wal- 
rasian  equilibrium  for v is a pair (z, p) such 
that z is feasible for v,p E DRe,  and for all i, 
vi(zi) -pzi  > vi(z') -pz'  for all z' E Re  (v). 
That is, i  maximizes vi(z')  + m'  subject to 
the (trading)  budget  constraint  pz'.  + m' = 0. 
Note  that z'  belongs to  1Re(v);  therefore, the 
values of  Ph  for  h e H(v)  are irrelevant 
since z' is zero there. 
Exploiting  the  quasi-linearity of  the 
model, define the maximum  potential gains 
from trade in v as follows:6 
g(v)  = max( Evi(zi):  z EZ(v)}. 
5To give an illustration,  suppose that individual  i's 
consumption  set is Re  and that he has an endowment 
ei  ElRe+ and preferences  over consumption bundles 
given  by ui: lR  +  11;.  Now suppose  that, if he becomes 
a baker,  his production  possibilities  set will be Yi  c  Re. 
Then for any  given  trade  zi E Re, zi is not feasible  for i 
as a baker if it calls on him to deliver  more of some 
good than he could possibly  supply as a baker-for 
example, some candlesticks  (assuming  he has no en- 
dowment  of  candlesticks).  That  is  vi(zi) =  -  oo if  and 
only if  wi  + zi + yi  lRe for any production  decision 
Yi  E Yl. On the other hand, if a trade zi is feasible  for 
i, his utility  from zi if he is a baker,  vi(zi), is simply  the 
maximum  utility  in consumption  he can achieve  given 
the trade,  that is, 
vi(zi) =  max uj(wj + zi + yi)- 
yi e  Y 
6We assume  throughout  that for all i and all vu  E V-, 
vi is continuous  on Z(vi),  Z(vi) is closed,  and 0 E Z(vi). 
We also assume for all v E V, Z(v) is compact.  Thus 
the maximum  (in the definition)  exists since Evi is a 
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As is well known,  in quasi-linear  economies 
maximizing  the  gains from trade is  both 
necessary and sufficient for achieving  effi- 
ciency. 
Definition:  The trade  z is efficient  for v (syn- 
onymously,  "efficient relative to v") if z is 
feasible for v and Evi(zi)  = g(v). An alloca- 
tion (v,  z) is (globally)  Pareto  efficient  if z is 
efficient  for v and g(v) 2 g(v') for all v' E V. 
As an application of the standard First 
Theorem of  Welfare Economics, we have 
the following. 
PROPOSITION  1: If  (z,p) is a  Walrasian 
equilibrium  for v then z is efficient  for v. 
PROOF: 
Let z' be any other feasible allocation  for 
v. Then from the condition for Walrasian 
equilibrium,  summing  over the i and recall- 
ing Ez' = 0 since z' is feasible: 
Evi(zJ) > Evi(z')  for all feasible  z'. 
That is, Evi(zi) = g(v). 
Nevertheless,  a Walrasian  equilibrium  for v 
can evidently  be very inefficient-not  glob- 
ally Pareto efficient-since  the set of feasi- 
ble trades  may  be restricted  to a very ineffi- 
cient subset of commodities:  people may be 
in the wrong  occupations.  We will be inter- 
ested in how the "invisible hand"  may be 
able  to  lead  the  economy to  a  Pareto- 
efficient outcome. 
Suppose occupational  choice is the Nash 
equilibrium  outcome of  a  game in which 
people hold rational  conjectures  about how 
Walrasian prices will  change when  they 
change  occupations.  Let  i&:  V--  Re be  a 
Walrasian  price selection in the sense that 
for each v E  , there are trades z such that 
(z, 6(v)) is a Walrasian  equilibrium  for v; 
and let 
Xi(v) = max{vi(zi)  -  (v)zi:  zi E  Re(v)) 
represent i's payoff (synonymously,  "profit" 
or "utility')  in the assignment  v under  prices 
#o(v). 
Definition: An  occupational  equilibrium 
(OE) is a triple (&, v, z) such that (z, #(v))  is 
a Walrasian  equilibrium  for v, and for all i 
and all vl E Vi, 
IrT(V)  2  ?i(vz,Vi) 
where vi  (vl,...,  vi-1+vi1,  v,,)  is the as- 
signment v with individual i  omitted; and 
consequently,  (vl,v') represents the assign- 
ment v with only i's occupation changed 
from vi to  v. 
The  displayed condition expresses the 
idea that v is a Nash equilibrium  in occupa- 
tional choice. In terms of traditional  eco- 
nomics, it picks up the idea of  resources 
flowing  into their (privately)  most profitable 
uses. We will be  interested in identifying 
conditions  under  which OE's are Pareto ef- 
ficient. Note that if (,v,vz)  is an occupa- 
tional  equilibrium,  then  7ri(v)  =  vi(zi) - 
O(V)zi. 
In an occupational  equilibrium,  the mar- 
ket outcome for v is obtained  from a prede- 
termined selection among the  Walrasian, 
and therefore price-taking,  equilibria  for v. 
This should be  regarded as a  convenient 
simplification in  which  we  ignore  the 
monopoly  problems  in a given v to focus on 
the monopoly issues across V. Note, how- 
ever, that the more variation  there is in the 
choice of "occupations,"  the closer this fic- 
tion will come to  mimicking  conventional 
monopoly. For example, consider a  seller 
with occupations/activities  that distinguish 
between different quantities of  the  same 
good supplied.  Then, the seller can observe 
the  Walrasian outcome from selling one 
unit, from selling two units, and so on (i.e., 
the  seller can observe the  aggregate de- 
mand schedule just as a simple monopolist 
would).  If buyers  are permitted  to have sim- 
ilar quantity-varying  "occupations,"  they will 
attempt  to exercise  their monopsony  power. 
An illustration  along these lines follows. 
Example  1 (Simple  monopoly  as an occupa- 
tional equilibrium):  Let e  =1  and partition 
individuals  into one seller, s, and B  n -1 
buyers indexed by b. The seller only likes 814  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  SEPTEMBER 1995 
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FIGURE  1.  THE  OCCUPATIONAL  EQUILIBRIUM 
IN EXAMPLE  1 
money.  His possible  occupations  are param- 
eterized by k e  [0,  K]; when in occupation 
k, he can supply  up to k units of the com- 
modity at a cost of  'q2 for any q E [0,  k]. 
Thus,  V9={vS:  kE[O,K])  where 
vk(z5)  =  (  2Zs  if ZE[-k,O] 
Vs(Zs)\-o  otherwise. 
Buyers are identical. Each buyer has no 
initial endowment of  the  commodity and 
values  its  consumption according to  a 
quadratic  utility function;  further,  we view 
buyers as passive here, and so we model 
them with only one occupation.  Thus, for 
each buyer b, Vb  {Vb), where 
a  1  72 
Vb(Zb)  a  (b  2CZb  if  Zb  0 
-  X  otherwise 
and where a and c are positive  constants. 
Let q* be the output where the seller's 
inverse  demand  curve  intersects  his marginal 
cost curve (see Fig. 1), and let us assume 
K > a. Writing 0(k)  for i9(  kV,S)  it is easy 
to check that M(k) is unique and given by 
c 
a  --  k  if  k <q* 
a -  q*  otherwise. 
B 
For efficiency, we want the seller to pro- 
duce q* and thus to choose an occupation 
k ?  q*. But the seller's profit,  -(* ), is maxi- 




where  his  marginal revenue  equals  his 
marginal  cost (again  see Fig. 1). His equilib- 
rium occupational  choice exhibits  the usual 
inefficiency associated with simple mono- 
poly:  he can influence  market-clearing  prices 
1?(k) by his choice of occupation  (quantity). 
Hence,  he  enters the  wrong occupation 
(undersupplies). 
II. The Main  Result 
A.  A Divergence  between  Private  Profit 
and Social Benefit 
The market  failure that Example 1 illus- 
trates  may  be explained  in terms  of a failure 
of  appropriation  at the individual  margin 
(i.e., as arising  from a divergence  between 
the  seller's private reward and his social 
marginal product). To  see  this, we  shall 
need some new terminology. 
As  a  preliminary  observe that, for any 
individual  i and any assignment  to occupa- 
tions v, the maximum  potential gains  from 
trade in v without i is given by 
gi(vi) = max{ E vj(zj):  Ezi  O} 
joi  j*i 
[Recall that  vi=(vj,...,vj_j,vj+,  ...,  V0) 
represents  the occupations  of all individuals 
except i.] Thus, individual  i's contribution 
to society is naturally  defined as the differ- 
ence between  the gains  from  trade  with him 
and without  him. 
Definition: The  (social) marginal  product of 
individual  i  in occupation vi when others 
are in occupations  v' is given by 
MPi(v) = g(v)  -  gi(vi). 
By contrast, the private marginal  product of 
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FIGURE  2.  VARIANT  OF EXAMPLE  1 WITH A FIXED  COST 
are in occupations  vi is given by 
PMPi(v)  =  XiT(V)* 
In an occupational equilibrium  (0, v,  z), 
since (z,  Y(v))  is Walrasian  for v, z is effi- 
cient relative to  v; that is,  Evi(zi)  =  g(v). 
Thus, EPMPi(v)  = g(v).  Further, we  have 
the following. 
THEOREM  1 (Inappropriability  Theorem): 
If  (z, #a(v)) is a  Walrasian equilibrium  for  v 
then, for each individual i, 
PMPi(v) < MPi(v) 
Thus, EMPi(v) 2 g(v). 
PROOF: 
Let z' be any set of trades that are feasi- 
ble  without  i  (i.e.,  that  satisfy E.  1z  =0). 
Then as in the proof of Proposition  1, from 
the definition of  a Walrasian  equilibrium 
for v, 
E  vj(zj) -  E  t(V)zj  E  vj(zj 
ji  j$i  j$i 
Thus, E  v.(z ) - E  ,(v)zj  gi(vi).  Mul- 
tiplying  ioth  sides of this inequality  by -1 
and adding  > 1vj(zj)  to both sides shows 
n 
E  v(zi)  -  E  vj(zj) 
j=l  j  i 
+  E  (V)Zj  < g(v)  -  g'(v). 
j 0 i 
However, recalling  the feasibility  of z, the 
left-hand side just equals vi(zi) -  M(v)zi, that 
is, PMPi(v);  while the right-hand  side equals 
MPi(v).  Hence,  PMPi(v) <  MPi(v),  as 
claimed.  The second assertion  of the theo- 
rem now follows immediately  from the fact 
that  EPMPi(v)  =  g(v). 
So "at best"  in an OE, everyone  will be 
rewarded  with his full social marginal  prod- 
uct. We call the result the "inappropriabil- 
ity theorem"  to emphasize  that usually  some 
individuals  will be  rewarded with strictly 
less than their MP's.  This was illustrated  in 
Example  1. In this example,  for any assign- 
ment v, the seller's  social marginal  product 
in v is the whole  gain from trade in v since 
no one else has any of the commodity  to 
trade; for example,  when k = k*, then the 
seller's MP is  the  entire shaded area in 816  THE AMERICANECONOMIC REVIEW  SEPTEMBER 1995 
Figure 1. But his PMP, his profit, is just a 
fraction  of g(v) since he faces a downward- 
sloping demand curve and so must give up 
some of  g(v) to  the  buyers as consumer 
surplus;  for example,  when k = k*, then he 
must give the darker-shaded  consumer  sur- 
plus triangle  in Figure 1. Thus, in the exam- 
ple,  the  seller appropriates  less  than his 
MP. This explains  why he undersupplies  in 
the OE: beyond k*, the change in his PMP 
is negative, even though the change in his 
social marginal  product  is still positive. 
While the undersupply  equilibrium  in Ex- 
ample 1 is bad, things could get worse: the 
unique seller may not want to produce at 
all. Specifically,  consider the variant  of Ex- 
ample 1 in which the seller, in addition to 
his marginal  cost, has a fixed cost C that he 
must suffer if he enters any occupation  k > 
0. Suppose this fixed cost exceeds  his equi- 
librium profit in  Example 1; that is,  his 
(now)  U-shaped average cost  curve lies 
strictly  above his downward-sloping  inverse 
demand  curve  (see Fig. 2). Thus,  while i(k) 
remains unchanged from Example 1, the 
unique occupational equilibrium now  in- 
volves autarky:  the seller does not produce 
any of the commodity.7  But also suppose 
that the  sum of  producer and consumer 
surplus  would be strictly  positive for some 
output levels (i.e.,  the  area of  the  dark 
shaded rectangle in  Fig. 2  [his losses in 
occupation q*] is smaller than the shaded 
consumer  surplus  triangle  in the figure), so 
the no-production  equilibrium  is Pareto in- 
efficient. In accord with traditional  teach- 
ing, the source  of the inefficiency  is that the 
seller cannot appropriate  the consumer  sur- 
plus his commodity  would produce. Or, in 
our language, he  would not  get  the  full 
social marginal  product  of his commodity. 
Remark  1 (Imperfect  competition  and appro- 
priation  logic): As is well known,  the market 
failures  illustrated  in Figures 1 and 2 would 
disappear  if we allowed  the seller to act as a 
perfectly  discriminating  monopolist,  not just 
as a simple monopolist.  But this extension 
of appropriation  logic to imperfect  competi- 
tion is  somewhat misleading. Apart from 
the well-known  informational  demands  con- 
fronting  the  perfectly  discriminating 
monopolist,  Theorem 1 can be used to show 
a fundamental  difficulty.  To illustrate,  con- 
sider the case of bilateral  monopoly.  While 
each of the two parties could appropriate 
all  the  surplus from the  other, certainly 
both could not simultaneously  appropriate. 
That is, the sum of  their MP's is strictly 
greater than the total gains from trade be- 
tween them-there  just is not enough sur- 
plus to go around. This is always  the case 
when there is  imperfect competition (see 
Makowski  and Ostroy,  1987). 
B. Giving  Individuals  Their  Marginal 
Products  Is Good  for Incentives 
Traditional  appropriation  logic, as amen- 
ded here to  emphasize individuals  rather 
than commodities,  says that any discrepancy 
between private and social marginal  prod- 
ucts will typically  be accompanied  by mar- 
ket inefficiency,  as illustrated  by Example  1 
and its variant.  But it also says that, if there 
is  no  such discrepancy, private initiative 
leads to socially  efficient allocations.  Let us 
now formally  examine  this second assertion, 
that giving individuals  their marginal  prod- 
ucts is good for incentives.  Accordingly,  let 
us suppose that, in an OE (,  v,  z), private 
and social marginal  products coincide at v 
in the sense that the following  condition is 
7The reader may have expected a  nonexistence 
problem. Indeed, such a problem does occur in the 
Walrasian  version  of this  variant  because  of the discon- 
tinuity  in the firm's  supply  curve caused by the fixed 
cost. In the Walrasian  version  the firm's  occupational 
choices are trivial, say Vs = {v }, where 
|2z52-C  if z  E[-K  ,O) 
v;(zs)={o  if zs=0 
00  -  oo  otherwise. 
There is no nonexistence  problem  in the occupational- 
choice  version  because  the firm  takes into account  that 
the  equilibrium  price will change when it  changes 
occupations  (quantity);  and when it enters any  occupa- 
tion k > 0, the fixed cost C is a bygone cost for the 
firm, so its supply  curve in any given occupation  k is 
continuous. Nevertheless, the  occupational-choice 
model does not guarantee  existence  of equilibria  even 
if  each  vi  is  concave  (see  Roberts  and  Hugo 
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met: 
Full appropriation  (FA): For every  individual 
i such that Vi * {vi} and every vi  E Vi, 
PMPi(vj',vi) = MPi(vj',v  i). 
(Notice  that any individual for whom  Vi= 
{vi},  a singleton, cannot influence prices by 
his occupational  choice since his choice set 
is trivial;  hence, we need not worry about 
his incentives.) 
Introduce the following suggestive nota- 
tion. Denote  a  change from vi  to  some 
other occupation  vi'  by Avi.  Let 
APMP. 




Av  =MPi  (vi', v i)-  mpi  (V) i 
In this notation,  FA implies  that, in any OE, 
APMPi  AMPS 
-  for all Av1. 
Avj  AvI 
But notice that 
AMP. 
A  -MRi(  Vi',  v i)  )-MPi  ( v) 
=  [g(v'vi) 
-  gi(vi)] 
-  [g(v) 
-  gi(vi)] 
Ag(V) 
9=  gv'v)g(v)-  = 
;v 
Hence, FA implies that, in any OE, 
APMPi  Ag(V) 
=  for all Avi. 
Avj  Avj 
But in  any OE,  individuals choose  their 
occupations  to maximize  their private pay- 
offs; hence, in any OE satisfying  FA, 
APMPi  Ag(v) 
-  <0  forall  Avi. 
Avj  Avi  A 
That is,  the  assignment v  is  not  Pareto- 
dominated by any other assignment  v' in- 
volving an occupational  switch by only one 
individual, Avi. Stated as  a  theorem, we 
have proved  the following. 
THEOREM 2 (Partial Optimality):  If it is 
the case that 0,  v,  z) is an occupational  equi- 
librium  satisfying  FA, then for all i and all 
v'  GE  Vi, 
g(v)  2 g( vl,vi)  ( 
The word "partial"  in the name of the 
theorem is to suggest two ideas. First and 
most obvious,  the theorem  is only a "partial" 
optimality  result in that it does not claim 
that v is globally Pareto efficient. Second, 
the word "partial"  suggests  in what sense v 
is efficient;  here the word is intended to be 
suggestive  of partial  derivatives.  The assign- 
ment v cannot be Pareto-dominated  by any 
changes  of occupation  in the individual  "co- 
ordinate  directions"  (i.e., by any Avi);  but it 
may be  Pareto-dominated  by coordinated 
changes  in the "diagonal  directions"  (i.e., by 
some Av  =  (Av1,..., Avn)  that involves sev- 
eral individuals  changing  occupations  simul- 
taneously).  Thus the theorem does not pre- 
clude the possibility  of coordination  failures 
in an OE, even when everyone  is rewarded 
with his or her social marginal  product.  We 
will examine this possibility  in Section II-C 
below. 
Remark 2  (The mechanism-design  connec- 
tion): Readers  familiar  with  Vickrey- 
Clarke-Groves  mechanisms  (William 
Vickrey, 1961; Edward H.  Clarke, 1971; 
Theodore Groves, 1973)  from the theory of 
mechanism  design  will see an intimate  con- 
nection between the proof of Theorem 2 
and the proof that such mechanisms  effi- 
ciently solve the revelation  problem.  This is 
no  accident; see  Makowski and  Ostroy 
(1987, 1992) for an interpretation  of these 
mechanisms  as mimicking  the logic of the 
perfectly competitive market. The  differ- 
ence is that, while in the mechanism  litera- 
ture there is a central allocator who can 
costlessly  find an efficient allocation  once it 818  THE AMERICANECONOMIC REVIEW  SEPTEMBER 1995 
knows the true types of  individuals,  here 
individuals  must find such an allocation  on 
their own. Thus there is the possibility  of 
coordination  failures,  to be discussed  in the 
next subsection. 
Combining  Proposition  1 and Theorem  2, 
we are immediately  able to state the follow- 
ing corollary. 
COROLLARY 1 (A  Partial Extension of 
the First Theorem): Suppose  that only one 
individual has  a  nontrivial occupational 
choice, that is,  Vi =  {vi}, a  singleton, for  all 
individuals  except  one. Then,  any  occupational 
equilibrium  satisfying  FA is Pareto  efficient. 
The corollary implies that we can con- 
struct an example of a Pareto-efficient  OE 
by modifying  Example 1 so that the seller 
always earns his social marginal product. 
Since the discrepancy  between his PMP and 
his MP resulted from facing a downward- 
sloping  demand  curve,  hence having  to-,give 
up a part of g(v) to the buyers  as consumer 
surplus, it should suffice if we modify the 
example so that the seller faces a perfectly 
elastic demand  for his product. 
Example  2 (An efficient  occupational  equilib- 
rium): This example is the same as Exam- 
ple 1 except that each buyer's  preferences 
now exhibit  a constant  marginal  utility  from 
consuming the commodity equal to  a  for 
the  first  d /B  units, where  d > K  the 
seller's maximum potential supply.8 Since 
d > K, the seller's inverse demand curve is 
now perfectly  elastic in his operating  range; 
that is, 
i9(k)=a  forall ke[O,K]. 
8That is, now  Vb  =  {V'b}, where 
rdl 
aZb  if ZbE [o  J 
Vub(Zb)=  d  1  d \2  d 
a  Zb  -  -  J-  2CZb-  B J  if  Zb>  B 
- X0  otherwise. 
Price  marginal 
cost 
a 
/  I  |  demand in 
/  .  '  Example 2 
0  q  d  Quantity 
efficient innovation 
under perfect competition 
FIGURE 3.  THE OCCUPATIONAL  EQUILIBRIUM  IN 
EXAMPLE  2 
Hence, the seller's  profit  lTs(14,vs)  1Ts(k)  is 
maximized  by choosing  any occupation  k  E 
[q, K]  and producing where his marginal 
cost  curve intersects the  perfectly elastic 
portion  of his demand  curve  (see Fig. 3). So, 
in accord  with Corollary  1, the equilibrium 
is efficient. Notice that FA is satisfied  since 
for any occupation  k he may choose 
iTs(k)  =  g(vsk,vs)  =  MPs(vsk,vs). 
It is interesting  to observe that this effi- 
cient outcome  is the limiting  outcome  of the 
occupational  equilibria  in Example  1 as one 
replicates the number of buyers.  As B  in- 
creases,  the inverse  demand  curve  in Figure 
1 rotates around point a  on  the vertical 
axis,  becoming more  and  more  elastic. 
Hence  asymptotically the  seller's profits 
would equal his full social marginal  product 
(the entire shaded  area in Fig. 1). Given  this 
context, one  can regard Example 2  as  a 
finite "magnification"  of the limiting econ- 
omy (notice that the length of the flat seg- 
ment in any buyer's  utility function, d/B, 
goes to zero as B approaches  infinity;  hence, 
buyers'  preferences  approach  Vb, the prefer- 
ences of  the buyers in  Example 1, as  B 
approaches  infinity).  A similar,  but asymp- 
totic, example  appears  in Hart (1979). VOL.  85 NO. 4  MAKOWSKIAND  OSTROY:APPROPRIATIONAND  EFFICIENCY  819 
Either the finite "magnification"  or the 
asymptotic  version of the example tells an 
interesting  moral:  a unique seller of a prod- 
uct may still be a perfect competitor  (in the 
sense of facing a perfectly elastic demand 
for his product  in the relevant  region),  pro- 
vided his desired supply is  less  than the 
demands of  the  highest-valuing buyers. 
Viewing  the seller as innovating  a new com- 
modity, the  example illustrates that  the 
phrase "a perfectly competitive innovator" 
is not an oxymoron.  This is the lesson of the 
literature  on product  innovation  under per- 
fect  competition (e.g.,  Hart,  1979, 1980; 
Makowski,  1980b, 1983). 
C. The  Coordination  Problem 
Continuing  with our suggestive  notation, 
let  Ag(v)/Av  = g(v') -  g(v),  where  Av = 
(Av1,..., Avn) denotes a change from v to 
some other assignment  v'  =(v1,...,vn).  If v 
is an equilibrium  assignment,  FA ensures 
A(V) < 0  for all Avi 
but it does not ensure 
Ag(V) < 0  for all Av. 
Av 
For some Av the changes  in the gains from 
trade may be strictly  superadditive: 
Ag(v)  Ag(v) 
iAvj  AV 
Example  3 (Computer  hardware  and  software): 
Suppose a  computer hardware manufac- 
turer could supply  a powerful  machine,  the 
value of  which would be  enhanced by a 
sophisticated  graphics  program,  and a soft- 
ware manufacturer  could supply  a sophisti- 
cated graphics  program  whose value would 
increase  if operated  on a powerful  machine. 
But either one without the other is suffi- 
ciently  costly  that it does not cover  the price 
buyers  are willing  to pay.  Therefore,  neither 
commodity  is produced, although the sum 
of their costs is less than the value of joint 
innovation.  (A numerical  illustration  will be 
given in Section III below.) The upshot is 
that if v is the assignment  in which neither 
hardware  nor software  is innovated  and i is 
a potential hardware  innovator,  then 
A(V) < 0  for all Av1 
Avj 
where Avi is any occupational  switch that 
involves  i innovating  hardware.  Thus, i will 
stay  out of the hardware  business,  even if he 
can fully appropriate his contribution.  A 
similar statement holds if  i  is a potential 
software  innovator.  Nevertheless 
Ag(v)  > 0 
Av 
for some Av  that involves  both the hardware 
and software innovators  producing;  so the 
OE is inefficient. 
D.  A Revision  of the  First  Theorem 
Our main  result  says  that, provided  every- 
one  is  rewarded with  his  or  her  social 
marginal  product,  such superadditivity  is the 
only possible  source  of inefficiency.  Say that 
the  changes in  the  gains from trade are 
subadditive  at v or, synonymously,  satisfy  the 
noncomplementarity  condition if the follow- 
ing holds: 
Noncomplementarity  (NC): For any assign- 
ment switch Av = (Av1,...  , AVn), 
Ag(v)  Ag(v) 
Avj  AV 
THEOREM  3 (A Revision  of the First  The- 
orem of Welfare Economics):  Any occupa- 
tional equilibrium  (0, v,  z) satisfying  FA and 
NC is globally  Pareto  efficient. 
PROOF: 
By definition of an OE, for all i and all 
Avi, 
APMP~ 
I  ?0. 
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Thus, 
APMPi 
<ppi0.  Au.  - 
But  by  FA,  the  left-hand  side  equals 
E AMPS  /Avi = E Ag(v)/Avi.  Thus,  using 
NC, 
Ag(v)  0. 
That is, no assignment  v' Pareto-dominates 
v. Hence, since z is efficient for v, (v,  z) is 
globally  Pareto efficient. 
III. Two  Settings  for  the  Revision 
FA and NC characterize  a reward  scheme 
that gives individuals  good incentives.  What 
market  structures  induce such payoffs?  We 
highlight  two: a thick-markets  setting and a 
thin-markets  setting. The former builds a 
bridge to the standard  First Theorem; the 
latter takes us into a more dynamic  environ- 
ment. 
Common  to both settings,  perfect compe- 
tition is a key ingredient for efficiency. It 
leads to FA. The following definition cap- 
tures the notion that there is perfect com- 
petition in an occupational  equilibrium. 
Definition:  All individuals  face perfectly  elas- 
tic demands  and supplies  (PEDS) in the oc- 
cupational equilibrium  (0, v,  z) if there ex- 
ists a price vector p such that for all i and 
all vi'  E Vi, 
Uh(Vi,V)  =Ph 
for all commodities  h E H(vi',v ). 
PEDS says that no one individual  can influ- 
ence market-clearing  prices  by switching  oc- 
cupations.  It is stronger  than the hypothesis 
of  price-taking:  Since  U(vi',  v)  is  a  Wal- 
rasian selection, PEDS  implies that if  i 
switched occupations from vi to  vi', then 
prices actually would not  change; so  his 
price-taking  is rational. 
To establish the link from PEDS to FA, 
we will need a technical assumption,  that 
individuals'  occupational  choices Vi are suf- 
ficiently  rich in variety.  A precise statement 
of the assumption  appears  in the Appendix, 
preceding  the proof of Theorem 4. We call 
an occupational  equilibrium  regular  if it sat- 
isfies  the  richness assumption. (The Ap- 
pendix contains the proofs of all remaining 
results.) 
THEOREM  4: For any regular  occupational 
equilibrium, 
PEDS  =FA. 
Thus, under perfect competition, each 
economic agent is  rewarded with his full 
social contribution  in whatever occupation 
he may enter: 
97Ti( *)  MPi(  *)- 
The injunction  to "profit-maximize"  (i.e., to 
seek  to  maximize one's selfish interests) 
agrees with the  injunction to  "maximize 
one's contribution  to society."  As we have 
already  emphasized,  such a reward  scheme 
gives good incentives, absent coordination 
problems  (failures  of NC). As we are about 
to show,  such problems  cannot  arise in thick 
markets. 
A.  Thick  Markets 
Suppose  there is a fixed number  of homo- 
geneous  commodities traded, with  many 
buyers  and sellers of each. In such a thick- 
markets  setting, competition  among buyers 
and sellers implies that no one individual 
will be  able to  influence market-clearing 
prices. Price-taking  behavior and complete 
markets-the  twin assumptions  that drive 
the standard  First Theorem-make  sense. 
We will show that 
thick markets =: FA and NC =: efficiency. 
If we interpret  the standard  First Theorem 
as saying that thick markets lead to  effi- 
ciency  (the  first  and  last  items  in  the 
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may be viewed as supplementing  the First 
Theorem by specifying  the reward scheme 
that induces efficiency. 
Definition:  Given an occupational equilib- 
rium (#, v,z), we will say that all commodi- 
ties are standardized  if 
H(v)  = H(vl,v')  =  . . . 
for all i and all vl e Vi. 
Markets  are thick  if both (i) all commodities 
are standardized  and (ii) all individuals  face 
PEDS. 
The formal definition highlights  two fea- 
tures of thick markets:  (i) all commodities 
can be supplied  irrespective  of any one indi- 
vidual's  occupational  choice, and (ii) there is 
perfect competition.  Condition  (i) is weaker 
than the  hypothesis of  many buyers and 
sellers of each commodity.  As emphasized 
above, many buyers and sellers would lead 
to PEDS. Thus, the two conditions are at 
least informally  linked. 
We have already  seen that PEDS implies 
FA.  The  next theorem states that when 
PEDS is combined  with standardized  com- 
modities  then NC will be satisfied  automati- 
cally. That is,  in  the  absence of  product 
innovation, coordination failures  cannot 
arise. This helps explain  the notable neglect 
of  such failures in  discussions of  welfare 
economics starting from  a  thick-markets 
perspective. 
THEOREM 5: In any regular  occupational 
equilibrium  (0, v,  z), 
thick markets  =* FA and NC. 
Remark 3  (Market  socialism):  The  thick- 
markets  interpretation  of the standard  First 
Theorem is perhaps the most natural one. 
But it is not the only interpretation.  In the 
market-socialism  tradition, price-taking is 
assumed to be independent of any market 
structure  (e.g., even in one-firm, socialized 
sectors). The First Theorem is interpreted 
as showing that market socialism  will lead 
to efficiency.  The outcome results from the 
fact that Walrasian  prices measure the so- 
cial  values  of  all  resources  at  the 
margin-even  in the absence of full appro- 
priation. Therefore, the  price system will 
coordinate an efficient outcome, provided 
agents act as price-takers.  To illustrate,  con- 
sider the Walrasian  version  of Example  1 in 
which  the firm does not consider  shading  its 
production;  hence its occupational  choices 
are  trivial,  Fs =  {vK}.  The  Walrasian 
equilibrium  for this economy will be  effi- 
cient-the  firm  will produce  q* units-since 
it is  required  to act as a price-taker  even 
though  in reality  it faces a downward-sloping 
demand curve. Thus, the  standard First 
Theorem  "goes through"  in spite of the fact 
that the firm only appropriates  a small  frac- 
tion of its social marginal  product when it 
produces q* in the Walrasian  equilibrium. 
This illustrates  that "coordination  via prices" 
is  possible even in  the  absence of  "full 
appropriation  via prices"-provided agents 
act as price-takers  even if it is not in their 
self-interest.  It is through  the logic of coor- 
dination via prices, not appropriation  via 
prices, that the First Theorem is tradition- 
ally proved.  For a critique  of market  social- 
ism as relying too heavily on coordination 
rather  than  appropriation  logic,  see 
Makowski  and Ostroy  (1993). 
B. Thin  Markets 
Suppose  now that commodities  are not all 
standardized;  rather, commodities  are het- 
erogeneous because sellers have the ability 
to personalize  their product  lines. Call this 
a  thin-markets setting. Further, suppose 
there is only a limited number  of commodi- 
ties produced  in any assignment  to occupa- 
tions (e.g., specializing  in the production  of 
software A  means not specializing in the 
production  of software  B), and as a result a 
large number of  commodities, even most, 
are not traded  in equilibrium. 
Because the set of all conceivable  innova- 
tions is huge, the hypothesis of  complete 
markets  becomes  problematic.  Further,  with 
decentralized knowledge, although  each 
agent knows best what products he could 
innovate, the set of possible innovations  is 
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to assume  that a Walrasian  auctioneer  could 
know of all possible commodities  and pub- 
licly announce a price for each is not only 
heroic, but also inconsistent with the hy- 
pothesis of decentralized  knowledge. 
In a thin-markets  setting, it is more ap- 
propriate to view each individual as only 
possessing  "local price information."  Recall 
that at any assignment v, individuals  can 
only register demands for commodities in 
H(v);  it is only as sellers  that they can change 
the  commodity space  from  WeMv)  to  Re(u,v). 
Therefore,  as buyers,  the relevant  prices are 
Vh(O),  h E H(v).  We shall assume  the follow- 
ing: 
Local Price  Information:  At v, seller i only 
has  access  to  prices  10h(v,  Vi),  h E 
U  v,{H(v,v9}. 
An individual  therefore knows  the prices of 
commodities  in H(v) as well as the prices of 
the other commodities  he can supply. As- 
suming  PEDS, the idea of local price infor- 
mation can also be expressed in terms of 
the price vector p: any seller i only knows 
the prices, Ph,  of the commodities  he can 
innovate.  This information  might  come from 
test marketing  or simply from an accurate 
estimate picked up as a result of being "in 
the business."  Note that when U, {H(v, vi)} 
is only a small subset of {1,..., e},  we en- 
counter a problem  not present in the thick- 
markets  setting:  no individual  has access to 
most prices. Nevertheless, as we shall see, 
efficient outcomes may occur, provided  in- 
dividuals'  local price information  is consis- 
tent. 
The possibility  of inconsistent  local price 
information  is intimately  connected  with the 
possibility  of coordination  failures (failures 
of NC). We can illustrate using the hard- 
ware-software example introduced  in Sec- 
tion 1I-C. Suppose that individual 1 can 
produce only hardware,  while individual  2 
can produce only software.  Assume that it 
takes 1.25 units of money to produce each 
unit of hardware  or software.  All potential 
buyers  of hardware  and software  have iden- 
tical tastes: 
vi(r, s) = min(r + 2s, s + 2r). 
That is, each buyer is willing to pay $1 per 
unit of hardware  (r) or software  (s)  if the 
other commodity is unavailable;  but each 
buyer is willing to pay $3 per hardware- 
software  package. 
It is easy to check that no innovation  of 
either hardware  or software is an occupa- 
tional equilibrium.  In the absence of soft- 
ware, individual  1 perceives  that he can only 
get $1 per unit of hardware,  less than his 
marginal  cost. Similarly,  in the absence of 
hardware,  individual  2 perceives  that he can 
only get $1 per unit of software. Both re- 
main out of business, in spite of the fact 
that the value of a hardware-software  pack- 
age exceeds the  cost of  such a  package. 
Observe that each individual's  local price 
information is  correct: $1 is  the  market- 
clearing  price per unit of hardware  (in the 
absence of software),  and similarly  $1 is the 
market-clearing  price of  software (in  the 
absence of hardware).  But the individuals' 
local price information  is inconsistent  in the 
sense that if they pieced their information 
together, the price vector p =  (1,1) would 
not clear the market  for both hardware  and 
software.  Indeed, since buyers  are willing  to 
pay $3 for each hardware-software  pack- 
age, at p = (1,1) there would be an excess 
demand  for both commodities. 
The example  motivates  the following  defi- 
nition. 
Definition:  Suppose (0,v,z)  is  an occupa- 
tional equilibrium  satisfying  PEDS. Individ- 
uals' local price information  is consistent  if 
the price vector p (defined in PEDS) satis- 
fies the following  condition  for each individ- 
ual i and each possible occupation  vi': 
7ri(vi,,v9 2  vi'(z'i)  -pzf  for all z'i  E-  0Re. 
Consistency  says that local price informa- 
tion can be  pieced together to  form one 
vector of prices which, if it were known to 
all, would  not change  trade decisions  even if 
each individual  could trade any combina- 
tion of commodities  he wishes  (not  just those 
in H(vi',  v).  In the hardware-software  ex- 
ample, PEDS is satisfied: individual  1 can 
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of $1 (if software  is unavailable).9  A similar 
statement holds for individual 2. But the 
consistency  condition is violated by buyers: 
they could increase their payoffs if  they 
could trade anywhere,  in  D2  at prices p = 
(1, 1). See Hart  (1980)  and Makowski  (1980b) 
for sufficient  conditions  for consistency;  not 
surprisingly,  differentiability  of preferences 
(absence  of strict  complementarities)  plays  a 
key role. 
THEOREM  6:  In  any regular occupational 
equilibrium  (,  v, z), 
PEDS and price consistency  FA and NC. 
The hypotheses of Theorem 6 are strictly 
weaker than those of Theorem 5: in thick- 
market environments,  price consistency is 
trivially  satisfied since H(vi',  v)  =  R.  Basi- 
cally, with thick markets, local and global 
price information coincide. 
The  (more general) thin-market  condi- 
tions for efficiency may be fruitfully  inter- 
preted using  the language  of externalities.  If 
an individual  imposes externalities  on oth- 
ers, then he does not fully appropriate  the 
consequences  of his actions. The model of 
occupational choice does not include the 
possibility  of real externalities,  but it does 
allow individuals  to impose pecuniary  exter- 
nalities:  any individual,  by switching  occupa- 
tions, may affect the terms of  trade that 
others  face and hence, indirectly,  affect oth- 
ers'  welfare. 
It  is  useful to  distinguish two sorts of 
pecuniary  externalities,  "market-price"  and 
"reservation-price"  externalities.  The signif- 
icance of PEDS (i.e., perfect  competition)  is 
that it rules out the possibility  of market- 
price externalities:  under perfect competi- 
tion no one individual  can affect the market 
prices others face. With thick markets,  this 
is  the  only type of  pecuniary externality 
possible. But with innovation,  another type 
of pecuniary  externality  may occur:  an indi- 
vidual, by innovating  one commodity,  may 
be able to influence the reservation  prices 
other innovators  see for their potential in- 
novations.  To illustrate, in the case of the 
hardware-software  example,  if individual  1 
marketed his hardware and sold it  at  $1 
each-even  though he would lose money 
doing so-then  individual  2 would see that 
buyers'  willingness to pay (i.e., reservation 
price) for his software has increased from 
$1 to $2, and so he would find it profitable 
to innovate  his software.  The hypotheses  of 
Theorem  6, namely,  PEDS and price consis- 
tency, rule out, respectively, market-price 
and reservation-price  externalities. 
Let us say that there are no pecuniary 
externalities  in an occupational  equilibrium 
if it satisfies both PEDS and price consis- 
tency. Then, our analysis may be summa- 
rized by: 
absence  of pecuniary  externalities 
FA and NC 
efficiency. 
That is, market  settings  that preclude  pecu- 
niary  externalities  (e.g., all thick-market  set- 
tings and some thin-market  settings) will 
induce payoffs consistent  with efficient be- 
havior. 
Remark  4 (Decentralized  knowledge  of pnces): 
There is an interesting  contrast  between our 
concept  of  local  price  information and 
Friedrich  A. Hayek's  view of the price sys- 
tem in "The Use of Knowledge  in Society" 
(1945). Hayek, while  stressing the  local 
character of  economic knowledge of  time 
and place, views the price system as com- 
mon knowledge guiding individuals  in the 
socially efficient use of their local informa- 
tion (e.g., his  famous illustration of  how 
different individuals  would cope  with an 
economy-wide  scarcity  of tin reflected in its 
higher  price).  In a world  of nonstandardized 
commodities,  however,  the sharp  distinction 
9PEDS  implies  that, as in Example  2, any innovator 
of any commodity  h  will always receive the buyers' 
reservation  price for his commodity,  no matter how 
many  units  he sells. The intuition  is that since the price 
Ph  must  continue  to clear the market  for h even if the 
innovator  switched to occupations  that allow him to 
produce  less and less of it (hence,  occupations  in which 
h  is getting scarcer and scarcer)  Ph  must equal the 
buyers'  reservation  price. The argument  is formalized 
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between local knowledge  of individual  cir- 
cumstances  but "global"  knowledge  of prices 
needs to be blurred  to recognize  local price 
information. Local price  information, al- 
though it economizes  on price information, 
introduces the  possibility of  inconsistent 
perceptions of  the  value  of  innovations. 
Hence the possibility  of coordination  fail- 
ures. 
IV. Concluding  Remarks 
In what sense is this is  a revision? By 
substituting  FA (or PEDS) for price-taking 
and by substituting  NC (or consistent local 
price information)  for complete  markets,  we 
took a much longer route to get to more or 
less the same conclusions  as the First Theo- 
rem. This was our goal. In our view, how 
that theorem is proved is at least as impor- 
tant as what is proved. The current state- 
ment and proof of the First Theorem  is too 
concise;  the argument  does not exhibit  suffi- 
cient potential complications  to allow one 
to grasp the essentials of why competition 
leads to efficiency.  We call attention  to two 
features  of our proof: one is how individual 
behavior is modeled, and the other is the 
role of  pecuniary externalities. Below we 
briefly indicate why these features are im- 
portant. 
Individual  Behavior.-In  the last decade, 
a gap has developed  between general-equi- 
librium theory and other branches of eco- 
nomics due largely  to differences  in sophis- 
tication about the meaning of "pursuit of 
self-interest."  With the  recent spread of 
game/information  theoretic  techniques,  the 
price-taking  behavior  of general  equilibrium 
appears  to be naively  simplistic  (cf. Samuel 
Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 1993; Joseph 
Stiglitz, 1993).  From the more sophisticated 
perspective,  general  equilibrium  would  seem 
to be fine for the more traditional  issues of 
determining  the relative  prices of standard- 
ized commodities (e.g.,  in  the  Hecksher- 
Ohlin approach  to international  trade), but 
when it comes to the many economic phe- 
nomena based on contracting,  asymmetric 
information, and  strategic behavior, one 
must look elsewhere. In our view, this per- 
spective is incorrect because general equi- 
librium need not be  identified with naive 
price-taking  behavior.  More importantly,  it 
is also ill-advised:  the full appropriation  un- 
derpinning  of perfect competition  provides 
both a canonical  model of the kind of incen- 
tive system that efficiently  channels poten- 
tially opportunistic behavior and  also  a 
canonical reason why-in  the  absence of 
full appropriation-such behavior can be- 
come socially  inefficient. 
Pecuniary  and Real Externalities.-In gen- 
eral equilibrium,  inappropriability  is associ- 
ated with real externalities  and is modeled 
as the incompleteness  of markets  associated 
with incompletely defined property rights. 
In the revision, property  rights to all con- 
ceivable commodities  are well-defined.  The 
only kind of inappropriability  permitted is 
of the pecuniary-externalities  kind, associ- 
ated either with the absence of PEDS or 
the absence of consistent local price infor- 
mation. 
Scitovsky  (1954) to the contrary  notwith- 
standing, pecuniary externalities have not 
been taken very seriously  since A. C. Pigou 
(1912) mistakenly identified as  efficiency- 
reducing  appropriability problems  what 
turned  out  to  be  welfare-benign price 
changes (Allyn Young, 1913;  Frank  Knight, 
1924). The moral drawn  from Pigou's  error 
was that pecuniary  externalities  should be 
distinguished  from welfare-relevant  owner- 
ship  externalities (Howard S.  Ellis  and 
William  Fellner, 1943). 
One can see the influence of this tradi- 
tion in the property-rights  approach  to ex- 
ternalities  (Ronald Coase, 1960). The mes- 
sage of the Coase Theorem  is similar  to the 
First Theorem. Once property rights are 
fully articulated,  efficiency  will be achieved. 
Besides complete property rights (the re- 
placement  for complete markets),  the other 
key assumption  of  the Coase Theorem is 
zero transactions costs (the  replacement  for 
price-taking  behavior).  In addition  to elimi- 
nating the typical  frictions  ignored in much 
of economic  theory  (e.g., the need for a title 
search in  property transactions), this  as- 
sumption is used to eliminate the "trans- 
actions costs"  which are due to imperfect 
competition-as  if zero transactions  costs 
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have as  efficiently as  price-takers.10  The 
main conclusion of the Coase Theorem is 
that all appropriability  problems  stem from 
ownership problems. This is more or less 
supported by conventional interpretations 
of  the First Theorem which trace depar- 
tures from efficiency to incompleteness  of 
markets. 
It  could be  argued that any failure of 
price consistency  is an ownership  problem; 
for example, the hardware-software  exam- 
ple above  would not cause any difficulties  if 
one  firm could supply both commodities. 
Recalling an earlier contribution  by Coase 
(1937), enlarging  the boundaries  of the firm 
is one possible  response  to the limitations  of 
local price information.  But carried to its 
logical conclusion, this remedy would lead 
to  one firm; the coordinating  role of  the 
price system  would be dramatically  attenu- 
ated. 
To  conclude, there is  a  basic contrast 
between our revision  and the exclusive  em- 
phasis  on ownership  externalities  in the First 
Theorem and the Coase Theorem. In the 
revision,  well-defined property  rights are a 
necessary  but not a sufficient condition for 
FA. Instead of drawing a line around in- 
completely defined property rights as the 
sole source of appropriation  problems,  the 
revision emphasizes the essential similari- 
ties between real and pecuniary  externali- 
ties. Both are instances  of the malincentive 
consequences  of inappropriability.  Alterna- 
tively  put, the economic rationale  for prop- 
erty rights is that it helps to achieve, but 
does not  automatically  establish, FA  and 
NC. That requires  real-not  just price-tak- 
ing-perfect  competition, as  well  as  the 
consistency  of individuals'  local price infor- 
mation. 
APPENDIX 
This section contains  proofs of the results 
in Section  III. As mentioned  there, to estab- 
lish the link from  PEDS to FA, we will need 
to  assume that  individuals' occupational 
choices Vi  are sufficiently  rich in variety. 
Specifically,  we will assume  that sellers have 
the  ability to  limit their capacities, as in 
Example 1,  by  appropriate occupational 
choices. 
Definition:  Individual i  can choose his ca- 
pacity if  for  any  vi'  E Vi  and  any capacity 
k > 0 there exists  an occupation  v1k  e VI such 
that  (i)  H(v1k,vi)  =  H(v1,v9),  (ii)  Z(vik)  c 
Z(v), and (iii) Zih >  -  k for all commodities 
h and all trades  zi E  Z(vik). 
The proviso says that i  can (i) supply the 
same commodities  in vik as in vi, but (ii) his 
trading possibilities are more restricted in 
occupation  vik,  and in particular  (iii) he can- 
not supply more than k units of any com- 
modity. Let vi?  denote the dummy  occupa- 
tion for individual  i, that is, the occupation 
in which Z(vi?)  = {0}. In the dummy  occupa- 
tion, i cannot  trade  with others,  so he effec- 
tively  withdraws  from the economy.  The oc- 
cupational  equilibrium  (U,  v,  z) will be called 
regular  if each individual  i  can choose his 
capacity and also can choose the dummy 
occupation  (i.e., vi0  E V1). 
PROOF OF THEOREM  4: 
Suppose V' # {vi}  and choose an arbitrary 
v!e V..  Let (z',  p)  be  Walrasian for v' 
(vi',vV);  and let G=Ej1o[vj(z')-pz'.]  Since 
Ej[v(z'))-pz]  =  g(v') and since viz)d-pi 
< MP1(v')=g(v')-g'(v')  (recall Theorem 
1), subtracting  shows 
G2g  (v'). 
It will suffice  to show that the weak inequal- 
ity is really an equality,  for then Ej[v(zj)- 
pzAJ=g(v')  and  Ej  * j[vj(z9)-pz]  =  gW(v). 
Subtracting  shows  vi(v)  vi(z') -  pz  = 
g(v') - g'(v')-  Pi(v'),  as required. 
To  verify the  equality, consider a  se- 
quence of  occupations for i  in which his 
capacity  gets smaller  and smaller:  {v1k}, with 
k -4  0.  Let  (zk,p)  be  Walrasian for  vk= 
(vik,  vy) (such a Walrasian  equilibrium  exists 
since  ie  is  defined as  a  Walrasian price 
l?George Stigler (1966) coined the  term "Coase 
theorem"  but added the qualification  that efficiency 
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selection and PEDS implies that prices re- 
main at p). Notice that since both z';  and Zj 
are optimal  for individual  j under prices p, 
for any k 
Vj(Zk)  _pZk  =  vj(z)  -pz/  for each j t  i. 
Further, since all allocations z  k  are in  a 
compact set  (recall footnote  6),  zk  ap- 
proaches  some limiting  allocation  z* as k 
0 (at least on a subsequence).  Hence, since 
Z(v ) is closed and v; is continuous  on Z(vj), 
vjZ)-pz*  =  vj(zj)-pzj  for  each  j *  i. 
Summing  shows 
E vj(zj ) - pzj I = G. 
j$  i 
Let  v9 be i's dummy occupation, let vo = 
(vio,v9),  and let (z?,p) be Walrasian  for vo. 
By construction, each  zj*  e FR(v0).  Hence, 
vj(z4)-pz9>  vj(z)-pz'  for  each  jt  i. 
Since Ejz  = Ej  = 0, summing  shows 
E  v,(z9)>G. 
j$i 




gi(v')  ?  G. 
This establishes that g(v1) = G, as was to 
be proved. 
PROOF OF THEOREM  6: 
We already know from Theorem 4 that 
PEDS implies FA. To verify NC, let v' E V 
and  let  z' E Z(v')  satisfy  Evi(z) =  g(v'). 
Price consistency  implies 
,ri (Vi',  V ) 2 vi'  (Z'i  )PZ'  - 
Note that, by FA, the left-hand  side equals 
MP1(vj',v9).  Summing  shows 
E MPi  (vi',v)  2 g(v'). 
Thus, since EMPi(v)  = g(v), subtracting  we 
see that for any assignment  switch Av from 
v to v': 
AMPi  Ag(V) 
E  -> 
Avi  Av 
Since the left-hand  side equals EAg(v)/Avi, 
we have arrived  at NC. 
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